In
August 2007 the United Kingdom experienced its first bank run in over
140 years. The over publicised queues outside the bank in Newcastle
did not help because it encouraged the savers to remove their savings
which exacerbated the problem even more. Although Northern Rock was
not a particularly large bank (it was at the time ranked 7th in terms
of assets) it was nevertheless a significant retail bank and a
substantial mortgage lender. In fact,only ten years earlier it had
converted from a mutual building society whose activities were
limited by regulation largely to retail deposits and mortgages. From
the outset, it adopted a securitisation and funding strategy which
was increasingly based on secured wholesale money (by issuing
mortgage-backed securities) and other capital market funding. At its
peak, Northern Rock had assets of over £ 100 billion and a growth
rate of around 20 percent for over a decade. Everything was operated
within the rules set by the FSA and Bank of England.
The
bank became heavily dependent on short-term funding in the money and
capital markets. And while the business model was successful for some
years, the risk eventually emerged in the context of global financial
turbulence focussed initially on sub-prime mortgage lending in the
US. As the amount of savers deposits were not enough to provide new
mortgages to customers the bank raised funds by using the existing
mortgages as collateral.
On
the face of it the Northern Rock crisis pales into insignificance
within the global context. Nevertheless, the Northern Rock is
particularly significant because it represents in a single case
virtually everything that can go wrong with a bank. Consider the
business model of the bank and how, in particular, it exposed the
bank to a low-probability-high-impact risk.
While
there is no doubt that Northern Rock’s business model was extreme,
one can argue that its underlying philosophy was shared by many other
banks. The combination of aggressive asset growth, minimisation of capital,
and funding risks designed to maximise rates of return on equity as a
common denominator.
The
Rock's model suggests that, the lower are the cash-assets and
capital-assets ratios, the riskier are the banks’ operations.
A
decade before the Northern Rock crisis, little attention was given to
crisis management arrangements.
The
point is made that the retail depositors’ run was specific to the
UK .
The
Northern Rock episode revealed a unique new role of the government in
effectively over-ruling the established Financial Services
Compensation Scheme (FSCS) by intervening to guarantee all deposits
at a troubled bank.
In
1997, the in-coming Labour government announced a major overhaul of
the institutional arrangements for financial regulation and
supervision. Since the 2000 Financial Services and Markets Act, the
UK has adopted a unified
supervisory
model. In particular, the supervision of banks was taken away from
the Bank of England and all regulation and supervision of financial
institutions and markets was vested in the newly-created Financial
Services Authority. While responsibility for systemic stability and
the provision of market liquidity remained with the Bank of England,
it was no longer to be responsible for supervising the institutions
that made up the system. There were several ways in which the crisis
was managed badly there were public disputes between the three
agencies, the Treasury, Bank of England and FSA. The major conclusion
of the tripartite authorities following the Northern Rock experience
is that the UK needs a special resolution regime for banks.
There
is an overwhelming case for having prudential regulation and
supervision of all financial firms located in a single agency.
Whether it is optimal to have the central bank responsible for
systemic stability while not at the same time being responsible for
prudential regulation and supervision of the institutions that make
up the system. Equally, whether it can act as an effective
lender-of-last-resort without having prudential oversight of banks.
The
reaction of giving a stronger role to the central bank in times of
stress makes sense as it is the organisation responsible for
financial stability and in the main such actions can take place
without access to taxpayer money, which would require ministerial
consent.
There are 5main lessons from this experience that need to be considered in all countries and not just in the UK:
1.
Deposit insurance needs to be designed so that;
a.
The large majority of all individual’s balance are fully coverd;
b.
Depositors can all have access to their deposits without a material break.
2.
The activation of emergency liquidity assistance arrangements needs to give confidence that those being assisited will survive, and should be seen as the system working as it should, rather than signalling some breakdown;
3.
There needs to be a regime of prompt corrective action for supervisors whereby prescribed actions of increasing severity are required within short time according to a set triggers based on capital adequacy and risks of failure.
4.
There needs to be a legal framework such that the fuctions of systemic importance in banks that fail can be kept operating without a material break;
a.
Such ‘failure’ should occur before the bank becomes insolvent so that there is little change of losses to the taxpayer;
b.
This will normally invovle a special insolvency regimes for banks.
5.
Some designated insititution to be in change of intervention in failing banks to ensure rapid and concerted action.
Finally
I would like to say that the depositors never lost any of their money
because it was covered by the government. But the original
shareholders did loose money because although Northern Rock
previously had assets of over £1 billion when the government took
over they only paid the shareholders a fraction of the true worth.
The share holders were, and still are, very unhappy about this and
formed the 'Northern Rock Shareholder Action Group'. They say “ We
believe it is morally and legally wrong for the Government to dictate
the terms of reference for the determination of compensation to be
paid to Northern Rock shareholders. We have therefore supported a
legal challenge to the approach the Government has taken with a view
to obtaining a fair value based on a truly independent and unbiased
valuation process using normal commercial principles.”
Sources: The Failure of Northern Rock: A multi dimensional case study, Northern Rock shareholder group,